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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper introduces a business application for a relatively new statistical tech-
nique called dyadic data analysis that has been developed in social psychology; it 
is also called the statistics of interdependence (Gonzalez – Griffin 2000). The im-
portance of adaptation and, consequently, interdependence between cooperating 
partners is widely accepted in business research. Today, it may sound stereotyped 
to say that interactions lead to adaptation on both sides of a business relationship, 
creating interdependence between partners. It is also widely accepted that this 
interdependence can increase the competitiveness of business relationships and 
firms cooperating in them (Noordewier et al. 1990; Dyer – Singh 1998; Fawcett et 
al. 2012). Successful partnerships necessitate a long-term orientation for both ac-
tors, adaptation and mutuality in several crucial relational characteristics such as 
trust, satisfaction (Ivens 2004), commitment (Holm et al. 1999), and power (Cox 
2004). Researches still lack both conceptual clarity and analytical constructs that 
are capable of measuring and analysing interdependence in general, and mutual-
ity in particular. Dyadic data analysis is an attempt to bridge this methodological 
gap (Gonzalez – Griffin 2000; Burk et al. 2007). 
Our paper presents research using pairwise sampling and dyadic data analysis. 
The research hypothesis is as follows: in a business relationship characterised by 
mutually high levels of trustworthiness perceived by each counterpart, the will-
ingness to be involved in risky situations is higher than in relationships in which 
actors do not mutually believe that their partners are highly trustworthy. Mutually 
high levels of trustworthiness can act as a governance mechanism and, in such 
cases, trust appears in the relationship. The above hypothesis is empirically ana-
lysed in situations in which sensitive information is to be shared between actors, 
creating risk and vulnerability in the relationship. 
The interplay between trust and information sharing is not a new research area. 
Dyer et al. (1998) investigated supplier-buyer relationships, including such char-
acteristics as information sharing and trust. They concluded that both of these 
characteristics were differentiating factors in a long-term strategic type of coop-
eration in the Japanese automotive industry. Dyer – Chu (2003) calculated the 
correlation between trust and information sharing in US, Japanese, and Korean 
automotive supply chain partnerships and established that there is a strong cor-
relation between the supplier’s trust in the buyer and its willingness to share 
confidential information with its partner. Kwon – Shuh (2004) interpreted infor-
mation sharing as a prerequisite for the buyer’s trust. Our hypothesis focuses on 
the turnaround effect; we analyse whether mutual trustworthiness can act as a 
governance mechanism in risky situations such as sharing sensitive information. 
These two approaches are not contradictory because a given level of trustworthi-
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ness between partners in a relationship is the result of an ongoing investment 
process (Otto – Obermaier 2009). Due to this ongoing investment process, the ac-
cumulated level of trustworthiness is both a prerequisite, but also a consequence 
of other relational phenomena. 
The most important limitation of the studies on trust is the way they measure 
and analyse relational characteristics, including trust. Although several research-
ers have already emphasised that research on any relational phenomena should 
be carried out in a dyadic way (Andreson et al. 1994), studies are still lacking this 
approach and are single-ended in nature (Brennan et al. 2003). As Henneberg et 
al. (2009) pointed out, researchers use five types of operationalisation when rela-
tional attributes are analysed, and only one of them is really a dyadic one. All the 
others capture only one side of the relationship, e.g. the customer or the supplier 
in supply chain type of relationships. But even if the way of measuring is dyadic, 
classic statistical tools are not capable of capturing important the effects of the 
specific context different business relations have. This inevitably means that ana-
lytical results systematically tend to generalise and fail. It is straightforward, for 
example, that satisfaction, commitment, or trust are all relation-specific and that 
their levels vary to a great extent in different relationships. Still, current research 
misses the opportunity to analyse the differences that stem from these relation-
specific contexts; for example, the differences in perceptions that exist between 
partners in concrete relationships (the so-called individual effect) and the differ-
ences between relationships (the dyadic effect) (Gonzalez – Griffin 2000; Burk 
et al. 2007). This limitation can be overcome with real dyadic measurement and 
using constructs of dyadic data analysis (Ickes – Duck 2000). To the best of our 
knowledge, dyadic data analysis still lacks a business research application. Our 
survey-based empirical research aims at filling this research gap and applies a 
real dyadic operationalisation and dyadic data analysis for testing our hypothesis. 
Our objective is not to develop the methodology, but to show an application that 
leads to a deeper understanding of trust. 
In the next section, systematic a literature review is presented. First, the theo-
retical background of our hypothesis is given, followed by a focused literature re-
view on the state of the art survey-based empirical research methodology related 
to trust in business relationships. We point out that these widely used solutions 
have severe limitations and are not capable of testing our hypothesis. We sug-
gest a research design and a methodology that guarantee real situational analysis 
and make dyadic measurement and analysis possible. We outline our research 
design and the applied methodology. Finally, results are presented and discussed 
in detail.
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION – DEVELOPING OUR HYPOTHESIS
Trust has an extremely rich literature that spreads over several areas even in the 
field of economics and management. We interpret trust as a governance mecha-
nism in business relationships; consequently, our paper is closely linked to Trans-
action Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975). Although TCE 
acknowledges that trust plays a key role in governing the course of events in any 
business relationships, it does not provide a clear definition of it. The business-
to-business transactions (B2B) literature is robust in this respect, although several 
competing interpretations and definitions are still available. In our theoretical 
foundation, first we introduce the concept of governance in general, and rela-
tional governance in particular, where relational attributes – such as trust – play 
the crucial role. Then we interpret the term trust and a closely linked concept, 
trustworthiness.
 2.1. Governing business relationships
The concept of governance in TCE is closely linked to coordination. Coordina-
tion mechanism is a broad term specifying the general rules of regulating and in-
termediating micro-level processes that takes place between cooperating partners 
in any relationships (Kornai 1984; Rosenbaum 2000). These rules include the 
mode of governance. Governance mechanisms are defined as safeguards against 
opportunism that firms employ in order to govern their relationships, when they 
face the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (Jap – Ganesan 2000; Olsen et al. 
2005; Wang et al. 2008).
TCE focuses on the two classic coordination mechanisms, the market and the 
hierarchical (or bureaucratic) coordination, but their representatives acknowledge 
the existence of additional mechanisms too. Ouchi (1980), for example, intro-
duced the term of clan coordination, where common values and beliefs (e.g. trust) 
play a crucial role in governing the relationship. Kornai (1984) introduced the 
ethical and the aggressive mechanism of coordination. In both cases, relational 
characteristics – altruism and power – are the instruments of governance. Medlin 
et al. (2005) called the type of coordination where relational attributes and norms 
are the ones that govern the relationship as relational coordination. On the whole, 
the theory distinguishes three basic types of coordination and their correspond-
ing governance mechanisms as follows (Jap – Ganesan 2000; Olsen et al. 2005; 
Zaheer – Venkatraman 1995; Yu et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2008):
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(1) market coordination and its governance mechanism: the contract,
(2)  hierarchical (or bureaucratic) coordination and its governance mechanism: 
ownership, and property rights, and
(3)  relational coordination: where relational characteristics (e.g. trust) play 
the role of governance.
According to TCE, three characteristics of the exchange influence the deci-
sion of which coordination and governance mechanism to apply (Williamson 
1981, 1985). These characteristics are the frequency, the uncertainty, and the as-
set specificity of the exchange. Let us imagine a continuum on one end, with 
transactions characterised by a very low level of uncertainty, asset-specificity, 
and frequency. The other end of this continuum represents transactions with ex-
tremely high frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity. In case transactions are 
uncertain, characterised by a high level of asset specificity, and/or are frequent, 
the ideal coordination mechanism is the hierarchical one, while around the other 
end of this continuum, market coordination is suggested to be applied (Figure 1). 
According to Ouchi (1980), clan coordination (as a specific representation of 
relational coordination) is suggested to be used in the middle of this continuum. 
This kind of interpretation supposes that different coordination mechanisms are 
exclusive to one another. 
2.2. Relational governance and related key concepts: trust and trustworthiness 
Other researchers (Bradrach – Eccles 1989; Olsen et al. 2005) suggested that in 
most real-life situations a mix of different coordination and governance mecha-
nisms are applied, so coordination and their governance mechanisms are supple-
Figure1. Supplementary character of different coordination mechanisms 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on Simon (1945); Bradrach – Eccles (1989); Poppo – Zenger (2002); 
Olsen et al. (2005).
Low level High level 
Market  
Coordination
Bureaucratic
Coordination
Hybrid 
Coordination
Relational Coordination 
Distinctive characteristics of transactions: frequency, uncertainty, and asset-specificity
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mentary in nature. When, for example, the above-mentioned distinctive features 
of the transaction tend to be moderately strong, hybrid coordination and govern-
ance is present, such as complex contracts with partial ownership agreements 
between partners (Dyer et al. 1998). These hybrid solutions combine the two 
classic formal coordination mechanisms, market with hierarchical coordination 
(Yu et al. 2006). But the supplementary character is true in the case of the rela-
tional coordination too (Figure 1). Neither a good contract nor full ownership can 
guarantee that all future, potentially risky transactions are governed. In these situ-
ations, relational norms play a decisive role. We accept the complementary nature 
of different coordination and governance mechanisms. Our hypothesis actually 
aims at testing the role of a special relational attribute in governing formally non-
regulated, but risky situations. 
Trust has always been an important feature and intensely researched aspect of 
behaviour between persons and organisations. Research on trust has a long-stand-
ing tradition in psychology (Deutsch 1958; Larzelere – Huston 1980). Based on 
their findings, several management areas have put effort into understanding trust 
between cooperating business organisations. It is clear that organisations do not 
behave the same way as persons do, and therefore conceptualising and measuring 
interorganisational trust is a real challenge (Anderson – Narus 1990; Zaheer et 
al. 1998). Despite the theoretical differences between personal and organisational 
trust, it is widely accepted that organisations can be interpreted as sets of actors. 
Organisational trust is also based on personal trust, consequently empirical analy-
sis captures interorganisational trust along the perceived level of personal trust 
among professionals (Zucker 1986; Bachman 2001). 
As pointed out earlier, while interpreting relational coordination and its gov-
ernance mechanism, TCE uses the term trust. According to the traditional inter-
pretation, trust is the credibility and benevolence of the trustee perceived by the 
trustor (Ganesan 1994). Kumar (1996) similarly defines trust as the confidence 
of the trustor that the counterpart in a business relationship will not exploit one’s 
vulnerabilities even in situations where such opportunistic behaviour would be 
possible. This interpretation is the basis of a rich body of literature focusing on 
different types of trust, where typology is based on the source of this confidence 
(Korczynski 2000). 
There is a different approach to trust in the literature as well. This draws a clear 
distinction between trust and trustworthiness (Mayer et al. 1995). It stresses that 
the above introduced concept is a characteristic of the trustee; thus, it is about the 
trustworthiness of the trustee and not trust itself. Trustworthiness is a perception; 
a perception of one actor, the trustor’s, about a key feature of the trustee’s. Trust 
itself is a closely related, but conceptually different term. It indicates the trustor’s 
intentions in risky situations with the trustee. Trust in this case is interpreted as 
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the trustor’s willingness to engage in risky behaviour with a counterpart in a spe-
cific relationship and a specific situation.
Risk plays a key role in both interpretations since trustworthiness as well as 
trust are important only in situations involving actions in which vulnerability and 
risk are present. It is an axiom in trust-related research that trust can empirically 
be investigated only in risky situations (Luhmann 1979). But the distinction be-
tween trust and trustworthiness outlined above is crucial. Based on this distinc-
tion, the terminology used by TCE has to be refined: Not trust, but trustworthiness 
is or can be the safeguard against potential opportunism and may play the role 
of governance, and influence the actual behaviour. According to our hypothesis, 
trust – interpreted as the willingness to act in risky situations – does depend on 
the accumulated levels of trustworthiness between partners in the relationship. It 
appears only when the levels of perceived trustworthiness are mutually high. In 
such cases, partners in the relationship will be willing to engage even in situations 
associated with a high level of risk that are not governed by formal governance 
mechanisms, either contract or ownership. 
Whether perceived levels of trustworthiness are enough to facilitate the ap-
pearance of trust and help governing risky situations is an important theoretical 
question that also has practical relevance. The answer to this question directly 
depends on the level of risk associated with the analysed situation (Gefen et al. 
2003). Therefore, trust-related research should be highly situational. Not only 
relational partners, but also analysed events should be very concrete. It is not by 
chance that qualitative case studies (Canning – Hanmer-Lloyd 2007) and experi-
mental economics are the preferred research methodologies (Wang – Huff 2007) 
in trust-related research. But we argue that survey-based research can also meet 
the requirement of this situational character when real dyadic sampling and dy-
adic data analysis are applied.
In the following, we develop the state of the art methodological profile of cur-
rent survey-based trust related research and highlight that this does not ensure the 
needed situational character of empirical research. Next, dyadic data analysis is 
shortly introduced, our own empirical research is presented, and the results are 
interpreted and discussed.
3. STATE OF THE ART METHODOLOGICAL PROFILE OF SURVEY-BASED 
TRUST LITERATURE
Analysing trust makes it necessary to be able to operationalise, measure, and 
analyse it in concrete situations. We have conducted a literature research review 
to map the state of the art research methodology and check to what extent it 
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meets the above-mentioned situational requirement. The majority of the papers 
on trust in business relationships have applied qualitative research (e.g. Friman et 
al. 2002; Lee – Trim 2012; Fawcett et al. 2012); we have omitted these from our 
review because we concentrated on papers applying quantitative analyses based 
on surveys. The same reasoning is behind omitting publications applying experi-
mental economics and game theory as their analytical method (Rieskamp – Todd 
2006; Pech – Swicegood 2013). We have processed 26 articles presenting survey-
based quantitative research on trust in dyadic business setting. All these articles 
were published after the millennium, so they represent current methodological 
solutions. Therefore, we think they constitute a sound basis for developing the 
state of the art methodological profile. 
Mutuality is a core concept in our hypothesis and a key issue in B2B research in 
general. Still, conceptualisation and measurement are underdeveloped in most of 
the papers. We accept the conceptualisation of Svensson (2006; based on Smith – 
Barclay 1997; Smith 1999). This points out that measuring mutuality necessitates 
the following two elements to be present:
(1) the levels of the relational characteristics in a given relationship perceived 
by the partners have to be measured in a dyadic way, because 
(2) only in such cases can the balance between these perceptions be captured. 
The conceptual separation, but also the analytical coupling of these two ele-
ments, makes it possible to measure mutuality in business relationships. This 
necessitates a clear dyadic approach in both measurement and analysis. We show 
that state of the art research methodology in trust-related literature is typically not 
capable of separating while simultaneously coupling the two above-mentioned 
elements of mutuality and capturing their systemic effects during analysis. This is 
because a real situational approach, dyadic measurement, and analysis are miss-
ing. 
During our literature review, we identified four key characteristics of the ap-
plied quantitative, survey-based research methodology that are relevant for a situ-
ational and real dyadic research. These key characteristics are as follows:
(1) concreteness of the analysed business relationship,
(2) concreteness of the situations analysed,
(3) applied sampling technique, and
(4) applied statistics.
(1) The concreteness of the relationship analysed: several papers asked their 
respondents to evaluate trust/trustworthiness in relationships without specifying 
the concrete partner being analysed. These respondents were typically asked to 
evaluate trust in their customer or supplier relationships in general. In our meth-
odological profile, these studies are called surveys applying general relational 
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analysis. In other studies, questions aimed at measuring trust in concrete relation-
ships. In these cases, respondents were asked to evaluate a concrete relationship 
with one specific partner (e.g. the most important customer or supplier). We call 
this type of analysis concrete relationship analysis.
(2) Concreteness of the situation analysed: although risk belongs to the core 
aspect of all trust-related research, none of the articles have analysed concrete 
business situations, where the actual level of risk could have been measured. 
(3) Applied sampling techniques: despite the theoretical differences between 
personal and organisational trust (Anderson – Narus 1990), it is widely accepted 
that organisational trust is basically a personal construct and it is measured us-
ing the perceptions of key informants (Håkansson – Snehota 1995). A specific 
problem is how to operationalise these perceptions. Henneberg et al. (2009) have 
identified five types of such operationalisation: pure monadic operationalisation, 
antagonistic perceived monad, internal dyad, perceived dyad, and dyad.
 Pure monadic operationalisation: only one partner’s informant(s) of a busi-
ness relationship participate(s) in the sampling process. The classic situa-
tion is when the representative of a customer or a supplier cooperating in a 
supply chain type of relationship is asked to evaluate the relational attribute 
under analysis. For example, a purchasing manager is asked to evaluate to 
what extent his/her company is committed to the relationship with a given 
supplier.
 Antagonistic perceived monad: as indicated by the name, here we also have 
a monadic type of operationalisation since only one side of the relationship 
takes part in measuring the relational attribute. Here we ask the representa-
tive of one party to indicate his/her perception related to the other party’s 
perception. For example, we ask the customer firm’s key informant: “Please 
indicate, to what extent do you think your supplier is committed to the re-
lationship!” 
 Internal dyad: this operationalisation aims at analysing the relationship be-
tween different relational attributes, for example commitment and trust. 
Measuring both attributes happens in a monadic (pure or antagonistic) way 
because only one side of the relationship participates in the survey. Let’s 
say, the customer’s informant is asked to indicate both the perceived level of 
trust and of commitment toward a supplier. 
 Perceived dyad (quasi dyad operationalisation): in such a case, perceptions 
related to a specific relational attribute are asked to be evaluated from the 
perspective of both partners. But again, only one partner of the relation-
ship actually participates in the sampling process. This operationalisation 
is nothing else than the parallel application of the pure and the perceived 
monadic operationalisation.
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 Dyadic operationalisation: this is the single really dyadic operationalisation, 
where key informant(s) of both partners are actually asked to participate in 
the survey and indicate their perceptions. 
The sampling technique is based on the type of operationalisation applied. 
During the literature review, we found several papers in which only one end of 
the relationship was asked to indicate perceptions (pure or antagonistic monadic 
operationalisation). Brennan et al. (2003) call this single-end sampling. In other 
articles, sampling was based on the perceived dyadic operationalisation, quasi 
two-sided sampling. Real two-sided sampling, based on the real dyadic opera-
tionalisation, was also present in literature. Papers measuring trust/trustworthi-
ness in a real dyadic approach can be further categorised according to the number 
of informants involved in the survey and the way sampling is actually carried 
out. Svensson (2006) distinguished between one-to-one and multiple informants 
sampling. Both were identified during our literature review. In the former case, 
only one key informant, while in the latter case, several informants on both sides 
are involved in measurement. A specific type of one-to-one sampling is pairwise 
sampling. Here, two key informants representing the two sides of a specific re-
lationship indicate perceptions in relation to the concrete partner as a person (the 
representative of the company). Pairwise sampling can also be carried out in the 
physical presence of the informants, making measurement highly concrete and 
situational.
(4) Type of applied statistics: all of the papers in the review applied classic 
statistics. Using traditional statistical techniques for analysing dependencies be-
tween two variables in the context of specific relationships (pairs) may create 
four common errors (Gonzalez – Griffin 2000). Let us assume that N pairs have 
evaluated the perceived level of trust/trustworthiness in a survey. This means that 
in traditional terms, we have 2N data points. The so-called assumed independ-
ence error occurs when this 2N is interpreted as the sample size and analysed us-
ing classic statistical techniques. The deletion error is present when N data points 
of the above-mentioned 2N are left out because we want to avoid the assumed 
independence error. Although this error will not always bias the statistical results, 
e.g. actual correlations, it is still a waste of analytical power to drop half of the 
data. Cross-level error is committed when researchers calculate the mean scores 
for two aligned data points of a pair and use it in further classical statistical analy-
sis (widely used in ongoing research). Depending on the degree of interdepend-
ence within dyads, these may result in false interpretations. Last, but not least, the 
levels of analysis error should also be avoided because correlations between dyad 
means cannot be interpreted as dyad level effects, while correlations between 
individual scores do not indicate individual level effects. 
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As mentioned already, the highest concreteness of dyadic operationalisation 
and analysis can be achieved by applying pairwise sampling, a special case of 
real two-sided, one-to-one sampling. In this case, the two cohesive informants of 
a given business relationship are called pairs. In statistical terms, the two scores 
given by these informants to the same variable represent one observation. (In our 
own research setting, this is the two levels of perceived trustworthiness of the 
two persons in a concrete pair representing a concrete business relationship.) In 
dyadic data analysis, these aligned data pairs are called dyads. In mathematical 
terms, these aligned data pairs define a vector. The special technique of dyadic 
data analysis aims at measuring statistical constructs between such vectors (Ken-
ny et al. 2006). The special approach of dyadic data analysis makes it possible 
to overcome the above-mentioned analytical errors. It offers statistical constructs 
for analysing both individual and dyad level effects within relationships. It is 
capable of capturing individual effects, for example, the effect of the perceived 
level of trustworthiness of a partner on his/her other relational perceptions (e.g. 
on commitment). It can also capture dyad level effects, e.g. the extent to which 
mutuality in perceived levels of trustworthiness in a relationship influences other 
relational characteristics (e.g. commitment) in the same dyad.
Along the above-described attributes, we have developed the state of the art 
methodological profile (Table 1) of survey-based trust related literature. This pro-
file indicates that these research projects can be characterised with a low level of 
situational concreteness; they still rely on single-end or quasi dyadic sampling, 
and exclusively on traditional statistical constructs. In our research, we aim to 
overcome the shortcomings of this methodology and apply situational analysis, 
pairwise sampling, and dyadic data analysis. 
4. A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST USING PAIRWISE SAMPLING 
AND DYADIC DATA ANALYSIS
Both trust and trustworthiness are dyadic phenomena that cannot effectively be 
analysed using single-end research (Brennan et al. 2003), monadic or quasi dyadic 
operationalisation (Henneberg et al. 2009), and traditional statistical tools, espe-
cially not in the context of mutuality. To overcome the limitations of this state of 
the art research methodology, we have analysed concrete situations and applied 
pairwise sampling and dyadic data analysis (Ickes – Duck ed. 2000). Our paper 
does not want to provide an in-depth presentation of dyadic data analysis; we 
only aim to highlight the basic differences compared to the traditional sampling 
and mathematical-statistical concepts, and to introduce tools directly relevant to 
our research hypothesis. Therefore, after a short introduction to the methodology, 
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Table 1. Research profile of state of the art methodology in trust-related and survey-based 
empirical researches
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Zineldin – Jonsson 
2000
x – x x
Handfield – Bechtel 
2002
x – x x
Brashear et al. 2003 x – x x
Dyer – Chu 2003 x – x x
Farrelly – Quester
2003
x – x x
Izquierdo – Cillán 2004 x – x x
Kvon – Suh 2004 x – x x
Ryssel et al. 2004 x – x x
Gountaris 2005 x – x x
Leung et al. 2005 x – x x
Svensson 2005 x – x x
Gao et al. 2005 x – x x
Barnes et al. 2005 x – x x
Ulaga – Eggert 2006 x – x x
Svensson 2006 x – x x x 
Zhao – Cavusgil 2006 x – x x
Caceres – Paparoidamis
2007
x – x x
Erikkson – Laan 2007 x – x x
Kingshott –Pecotich 
2007
x – x x
Liu et al. 2009 x – x x
Nielsen – Nielsen 2009 x – x x
Panayides – Lun 2009 x – x x
Yeung et al. 2009 x – x x
Wagner et al. 2010 x – x x
Davis et al. 2011 x – x x
Jiang et al. 2012 x – x x
Source: Author’s own compilation.
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we describe the empirical research conducted. A detailed description of the sta-
tistical background of dyadic analysis – this relatively new statistical toolset – is 
given in the works of Gonzalez – Griffin (2000) and Kenny et al. (2006). 
In case of a dyadic data analysis, two coherent scores – a vector – specify one 
observation related to the analysed phenomenon, the perceived levels of trust-
worthiness in our case, and analytical tools try to capture statistical relationships 
between these vectors. Dyadic data always contain a mix of dyad and individual 
level information. Separating these two levels “requires an approach that explic-
itly identifies and models the degree of interdependence within and between vari-
ables at each level of analysis” (Gonzales – Griffin 2000: 183). Pairwise sam-
pling is suggested because it helps researchers to think in a structured way about 
processes and effects in concrete dyads, and makes it possible to ask questions at 
both the dyad and the individual levels. The method applies double entry coding 
(Gonzales – Griffin 2000). Double entry is a tool that transforms the 2xN matrix 
of observations developed by pairwise sampling into a 2N vector. This data trans-
formation makes it possible to use standard statistical programme packages in our 
examinations.
Dyadic data analysis can be applied for exchangeable and also distinguishable 
cases. These two cases necessitate different statistical solutions for further analy-
sis. The so-called dyadic homogeneity analysis is necessary to decide whether 
a case is exchangeable or distinguishable. In dyadic data analysis, homogeneity 
analysis is a means to test whether two respondents in the pair have a similar or 
different answers to a given question. We have conducted this analysis and found 
that our cases are exchangeable (Gonzales – Griffin 2000), consequently the ICC 
and APIM dyadic regression models suggested could have been applied. 
As mentioned in the introduction, our research hypothesis is as follows: in 
a business relationship characterised by mutually high levels of trustworthiness 
perceived by each counterpart, the willingness to be involved in risky situations 
is higher than in relationships in which actors do not mutually believe that their 
partners are highly trustworthy. In these cases, mutually high levels of trustwor-
thiness act as a governance mechanism, and trust appears in the relationship. 
The above hypothesis is empirically analysed in situations in which sensitive 
information is to be shared between actors, creating risk and vulnerability in the 
relationship. 
To test our hypothesis, we had to apply the dyadic regression analysis devel-
oped for exchangeable cases. These models are the ICC (Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient Model) and the APIM (Actor-Partner Interdependence Model) model 
(Gonzalez 2010). These models analyse how one or more variable (the independ-
ent variables of the regression model) determine the value of a dependent vari-
able. In our analysis, the dependent variable was the willingness to act in a risky 
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situation (trust), specifically the willingness to share risky information with a 
partner (and his/her organisation). The independent variables were related to the 
perceived levels of trustworthiness in specific pairs. 
The regression models of dyadic data analysis are special because they can 
incorporate several effects into the regression function: the actor and the partner 
effect (ICC model). APIM is even more complex because it also incorporates the 
so-called mutual effect, which is the effect of mutuality in the perceived levels of 
a given relational attribute between concrete partners in a pair. These effects are 
interpreted as follows:
(1)  actor effect: effect of the partner’s trustworthiness as perceived by the ac-
tor in a dyad on the actor’s willingness to share information with the part-
ner,
(2)  partner effect: effect of the actor’s trustworthiness as perceived by the 
partner in a dyad on the actor’s willingness to share information with the 
partner, and
(3)  mutual effect: effect of mutuality in the above-perceived levels of trust-
worthiness on the actor’s willingness to share information with the part-
ner.
Because our hypothesis does stress mutuality in the perceived levels of trust-
worthiness, our expectations were that only results using the APIM model will 
support our hypothesis. The mathematical formula for the APIM model is as fol-
lows:
 0 1 2 3' ',Y X X X Xβ β β β       
where Y is the dependent variable, and the values of β0, β1, β2 and β3 are regression 
values. X and X’ are independent variables, the two perceived levels of trustwor-
thiness in a given dyad. Predictor X represents the actor’s influence on the actor’s 
Y; predictor X’ represents the partner’s influence on the actor’s Y. The product 
X·X’ is a new independent variable indicating the mutual effect of these levels on 
the dependent variable (Kenny et al. 2006). 
The ICC model is different from APIM only in the respect that it does not in-
corporate the mutual effect (Gonzalez 2010).
We have developed a questionnaire, which was used during sample develop-
ment. Respondents were asked to evaluate:
 the perceived level of trustworthiness toward his/her concrete partner in the 
pair, and 
 the perceived level of trustworthiness toward the partner’s company as an 
organisation.
(The original scale was –3 to +3 and has been recorded into a 1–7 Likert 
scale.) 
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As already mentioned, trust between persons and organisations are closely re-
lated, but nevertheless different concepts (Anderson – Narus 1990). There are 
only a limited number of papers studying these differences (Swan – Nolan 1985; 
Young – Wilkinson 1989). We expected that our empirical research will enrich 
the body of knowledge in this respect too, since our questionnaire not only asked 
respondents to indicate the level of perceived trustworthiness toward his/her con-
crete partner as a person, but also the perceived level of trustworthiness toward 
the company represented by this person.
Next, we asked our informants to indicate whether they are willing to share 
with their pairs the following types of information (yes/no):
 operational information related to transactions with your partner (e.g. order 
volumes, due dates, inventory levels),
 operational information related to other, third-party companies,
 information related to future innovations and strategic actions, and
 financial information concerning your company (e.g. cost level, profit mar-
gin).
Similarly to the level of trustworthiness, informants had to indicate
 whether they were willing to share risky information with their concrete 
partner in a pair, but also 
 their willingness to share this information with another hypothetical repre-
sentative of the partner’s firm. 
We organised several workshops with purchasing and logistics professionals 
– two typical boundary spanning professionals in supply chain types of business 
relationships – and asked them to complete our questionnaire using pairwise sam-
pling. This data gathering was carried out in the physical presence of respondents, 
but in an anonymous way. Concrete answers were neither visible nor accessible 
to the participants in order to avoid biases in responses. We gathered 96 pairs of 
questionnaires, with 192 dyadic data points.1 
The workshops started with pairwise sampling. We did not discuss any of the 
concepts in the questionnaire (trust, trustworthiness, or risk). Only after sampling 
did we allow our respondents to evaluate the four concrete information sharing 
situations. They indicated that sharing operational information is a must and is 
1  The situations under investigation are virtual in nature. Real-life situations are analysed us-
ing a qualitative approach, mainly case studies. This methodology has the advantage of high 
reliability, but it also has limitations, its generalisability for example. Mathematical-statistical 
constructs are strong in this latter aspect. This is the reason why we have chosen the survey-
based statistical methodology and have tried to map the limitations of current techniques. 
Behavioural economics can also be used for modelling our problem. But behavioural game 
theory has the same limitations in this respect. They are used in laboratory environments and 
virtual situations.
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therefore not associated with any type of risk. They did not associate real risk 
either with sharing third-party information or innovation-strategic-related infor-
mation; only sharing financial information was perceived by the respondents to 
be a situation associated with a high level of risk. 
5. RESULTS
In our empirical analysis, 32 dyadic regression functions were developed. These 
functions differed along the following dimensions:
 whether the ICC or the APIM model has been applied,
 the built-in independent variables: the type of the partner in the analysis, or 
whose perceived trustworthiness has been evaluated: the concrete partner as 
a person in the pair or the company the person was representing,
 the dependent variable: the type of the partner with whom the information 
sharing situation was tested: with the actual partner as a person in the pair-
wise sampling process or another hypothetical representative of the com-
pany for which the actual partner in the pair was working, and
 four information sharing situations characterised by different levels of risk. 
According to our expectations, applying the ICC model – which does not sys-
tematically build into the model the effect of mutuality – will not support the 
hypothesis. This expectation was backed by our empirical results: no significant 
regression models using the ICC method could have been developed. 
We asked our informants to indicate the willingness to share risky informa-
tion with both the concrete person in his/her pair, but also with other, hypotheti-
cal employees of the company represented by these persons. The former tested 
trust in an interpersonal, the latter in an organisational context. In both cases, the 
mutually high level of perceived trustworthiness led to the appearance of trust; 
partners were willing to engage in a situation with high level of risk, namely shar-
ing financial information.
As mentioned, informants indicated that real risk is associated only with the 
situation of sharing financial information. This was the only situation in the re-
search that needed relational governance. Therefore, we expected that results will 
be supportive only when regression models are related to this type of situation. 
This expectation was also fulfilled: the regression models were never significant 
when situations with low levels of associated risk were analysed. However, re-
gression models related to the situation of financial information sharing were 
significant and the R2 values were also supportive. These regression models were 
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4 and 8 (Tables 2 and 3). Since regression models 4 and 8 were both satisfactory 
and differed only in respect of whose perceived trustworthiness was measured 
(the person’s or the company’s in general), we developed a 33rd regression model 
that incorporated both types of perceived trustworthiness (Table 3). The model 
was also significant and resulted in the highest R2 value.
Table 2. Characteristics of the 32 regression models developed with a focus on the APIM model
Numbers of the regression 
models
Characteristics of these 
models
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 From the 17th 
to the 32nd  
regression 
models apply-
ing the ICC 
model.
…
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Sharing 
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information
x x x x
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information
x x x x
Sharing 
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information
x x x x
Sharing financial 
information
x x x x
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our paper aimed to test the following hypothesis: in business relationships char-
acterised by mutually high levels of trustworthiness, the willingness to be in-
volved in risky situations is higher than in relationships in which the actors do not 
believe that their partners are highly trustworthy. In situations characterised by 
mutually high levels of trustworthiness, it actually acts as a governance mecha-
nism: trust appears in the relationship and risky situations are willing to be taken. 
The hypothesis was empirically analysed using survey-based research methodol-
ogy in situations where sensitive information was to be shared between partners, 
creating the perception of risk and potential vulnerability. 
Empirical results supported this hypothesis, having direct managerial rel-
evance. This means that building mutually high levels of trustworthiness is a 
rewarding investment because it may help in governing risky situations inevita-
bly emerging in business relationships. According to our results, trust can only 
be detected when mutuality is present. The absence of a mutually high level of 
trustworthiness does not generate trust and so may lead to the deterioration of the 
partnership. In today’s turbulent environment, characterised by globalisation, the 
intense outsourcing of important capabilities and constant innovation and knowl-
edge sharing, such risky situations arise day by day. 
Table 3. Key results
No. of models Dependent 
variable
Independent variables of the 
regression functions
Value of R2 Significance* of the 
regression model
Perceived level of trustworthiness of the partner as a person – APIM – information sharing 
with the partner as a person
4. InfoFinancial1 Trustworthiness1
Trustworthiness2
TrustworthinessMutual
0.207 Significant
Perceived level of trustworthiness of the partner’s firm – APIM – information sharing 
with the partner as a person
8. InfoFinancial1 TrustworthinessFirm1
TrustworthinessFirm2
TrustworthinessFirmMutual
0.272 Significant
Perceived level of trustworthiness of both the partner as a person and the partner’s firm – APIM – 
information sharing with the partner as a person
33. Trustwothiness1
Trustwothiness2
TrustwothinessMutual
TrustwothinessFirm1
TrustwothinessFirm2
TrustwothinessFirmMutual
0.302 Significant
Note: * p < 0.01.
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Trust has a rich literature and is widely expected as an important relational 
characteristic that has a positive effect on both relationships’ and firms’ competi-
tiveness. So what is new in our findings? An important element of our hypoth-
esis was the mutuality in the perceived levels of trustworthiness. Mutuality is 
also often stressed in trust-related literature (Ivens 2004), but only scarcely ever 
conceptualised and analysed systematically in survey-based empirical research 
projects. The literature also points out that any relational characteristics should 
be analysed in a concrete dyadic setting (Brennan et al. 2003; Henneberg et al. 
2009). Unfortunately, research methodology is lagging behind requirements in 
this respect too. Based on a literature review of 26 trust-related publications, we 
have developed a state of the art methodological profile. This profile showed that 
empirical research is never really specific in respect of the analysed situation, 
and sometimes even analysed relationships fail to be specific. It still relies on 
single-end research, only very seldom applies real dyadic operationalisation, and 
uses traditional statistical constructs. The empirical results of studies with such a 
methodological profile are biased and can be questioned. 
Our survey-based empirical research tried to overcome these methodologi-
cal limitations. We carried out a highly situational research and applied a real 
dyadic operationalisation and analysis. We used the pairwise sampling method 
and the dyadic data analysis that has been developed in order to capture interde-
pendences between partners in relationships – including the issue of mutuality. 
Pairwise sampling was already applied in business setting, but to the best of our 
knowledge, dyadic data analysis had lacked such an application. In this respect, 
our paper is unique. It tries to fill the methodological research gap outlined with 
the state of the art methodological profile developed. Qualitative case studies and 
experimental economics fulfil the requirement of situational and dyadic analy-
sis. But extended survey-based empirical research is needed in order to develop 
knowledge that is reliable and generalisable at the same time. Therefore, we be-
lieve that any paper focusing on methodological challenges, discussing methodo-
logical developments, and highlighting potential solutions is important.
The research described and the results presented raise four methodological – 
but also theoretical – issues:
(1) Does mutuality really matter in relationship management?
(2) Does analysing trust or any other relational attribute really need a dyadic 
operationalisation?
(3) To what extent is trust as a governance mechanism situational?
(4) Is interpersonal trust the same as interorganisational trust?
We developed 33 regression models altogether. Of these 33 models, only those 
have led to supportive results
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 that have systematically incorporated into the regression model the effect of 
mutuality in the perceived levels of trustworthiness,
 were related to the only situation characterised with high level of risk and 
vulnerability, specifically the situation of information sharing, and
 where the dependent variable of the model was related to information shar-
ing with the actual person in the pair during the pairwise sampling and not 
the company in general this partner person was representing.
Our empirical results confirm the statement that only situations associated 
with a high level of risk and potential vulnerability are suitable to detect trust 
and to analyse the role of trustworthiness in relationship governance. Situations 
where real risk is not present do not necessitate relational governance. Therefore, 
analysing relationships (even specific ones) in general is not appropriate when 
trust/trustworthiness is a key concept of the research model. 
In our survey, we measured separately the perceived level of trustworthiness 
of the concrete person in a pair and the level of trustworthiness perceived toward 
the company in general. In both cases, regression models were significant when 
perceived levels of trustworthiness were mutually high and the situation associ-
ated with a high level of risk was analysed. This result indicates that it does not 
seem to be a distinguishing feature whose trustworthiness is measured, a person’s 
or generally the company’s. But it does seem to matter with whom the risky situ-
ation has to be handled. High levels of mutual trustworthiness perceived toward 
the partner and also toward his/her firm can facilitate risky information sharing 
with the concrete person, present during pairwise sampling. Noone was willing 
to share financial information with other representatives of the partner firm under 
any circumstances. These surprising results indicate that research on relational 
characteristics have to devote more effort into understanding differences between 
interpersonal and interorganisational settings. 
The paper tried to focus on the methodological challenges of today’s trust-
related survey-based research practice. The situational character of the research, 
measuring mutuality in a systemic way using real dyadic operationalisation and 
analysis were all present in our survey-based research project. We hope we were 
able to draw attention to these methodological problems, make some suggestions, 
and enhance further thinking.  
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